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In the Suprente Court of the 
State of Utah 
LA MAR PEAY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF PROVO 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a body COII"pO- CASE 
rate and politic, and :MERRILL CHRIS~ NO. 9722 
TOPHERSON, RAY MURDOCK, SHffi-
LEY PAXMAN, WILFORD E. SMITH, 
and LA MAR EMPEY, Members of said 
Board, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS• BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action contests the validity of a special election 
held in Provo City School District February 6, 1962, called 
by the Board of Education, pursuant to Section 11, Chap-
ter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, now identified as Section 53-
7-24. Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appeal is taken from an order of ·the lower court 
granting respondenrt:s' motion to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to state a claim foc which relief may be granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because it appears to us thart the ~statement of facts 
in .Aippellant's brief inadvertently omitted ~certain facts and 
is, we believe, unduly condensed, we shall present rur staJte-
ment of the facts ibef'Ore the court. 
Thls case was determined in the lower 1court on the 
pleadings. To tlle amended complaint (R. 6 ff) respond-
ents addressed three motions: a motion to strike, a motion 
to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to Sltate a 
claim upon Which relief may be granted, and a motion for 
summary judgment (R. 18). 
After making these motions, not before, ·as st:aJted page 
3 of A:ppellant's brief, respooden1:s filed an answer to the 
amended oomplaint. (R. 21ff) and notice of readiness for 
trial (R. 25). The C'Otlrt then set the matter for pre-trial 
and argument rm the moti·ons ( R. 26) . 
The undisputed facts as shown from the pleadings are 
tJhat tJhe Board of Education of Provo City School District, 
pursuant to Section 11 of Ohapter 104, Laws of Utah, 1961 
(53-7-24, Utah Code .Amlotated 1953), called a special elec· 
tion for February 6, 1962, to vote oo the followm,g ques-
tion: 
"Shall the Board of Education of Provo City, State of 
U1Jah be authorized to maintain a 'voted leeway' pro-
. ~ as provided in Section 11,- Chapter 104, Laws of 
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3 
Utah 1961, not to exceed ten per cent of the minimum 
basic program provided by law." 
The election thus called was held, the votes cast were 
thereafter canvassed, and 1:Jhe proposition declared passed 
by a vote of 2,224 for, and 1,829 against. 
No question is raised as to the procedural manner m 
which the Boa:rd called the election. Except as pointed 
rut hereafter, no question is raised as to the sufficiency of 
the notice of election, nor are questions mised concerning 
the length of time between first publication of the notice 
and date of the election, lC~Ca~tioo of the polls, names of 
judges, hours during whioh the polls shall remain open, and 
the like. Except as further pointed out hereafter, no ques-
tion is raised as to the conduct of the election or the oan-
v~ of returns. 
The amended complaint, without citation to specific con~ 
stltuoonal provisions, asserted that the statute under whlch 
the election was called and held is unCOOSJti.tutiooal (a) be-
cause it is vacaue and uncel"tJain, and (ib) because it permit-
ted qualified electors, without reference to whether they 
had paid a property tax in the precemng year, tO vote 
oo the proposition. It further alleged that the notice calling 
the election was insufficient to i.nfoml the electors as to 
the proposiHon they were called to vote upon. 
The Appellant's pleadings nowhere raise rthe issue as 
to sufficiency of the title to Chapter 104, Laws of_ U1la!h 
1961. under the mandate of Section 23, Article VI, Utah , 
Constitution. 
Rest>ondents' answer raises a question of fact. It de-
nied that noo-.taxpaying electors voted, or in the alternative, 
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that if they so did, there were insufficient such votes to 
change tJhe result. Under the ruling of the trial court, this 
i>Ssue became immaterial. 
ThTee issues of law were raised and argued at the pre. 
trial and argument on the motions (R. 28) : 
(1) Is Section 11, Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961 
rendered unconstitutional for vagueness and uncertJainty, 
by reason of its reference Section 53-2-12, U.C.A. '53 (which 
would render it unintelligible)? 
(2) Is !i!t further unOOllSiti:tutional because the ques-
tioned s1:1atute does not require a property qualification of 
electors? 
( 3) Was rthe notice of electJion sufficient to Worm 
the electoos as to the proposition they were to vote upon? 
The trial court t!ound against appellant on all three 
isSiues (R. 28) and entered its order <tisrrrissing the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon · whlch relief may 
be granted· (R. 29). The appeal is rfrom this order. 
·The additional issue argued by appellant-that the 
questioned statute violates Section 23, Article VI, Utah Con-
stiturt:ion_.was found iby the court IlOit to have been raised 
in the pleadings. However, the trial court opined that the 
statute was not vioJative of that section. Though not thus 
mised in tlhe pleadings, appellant argues the point in his 
brief, page 12, point IT. We will meet that argument with· 
out ia qmbble on procedural grounds. 
Issue number (2,) above, is the questioned statute un-
COOSJtitutiooal because it requires no property qualifications 
o!f electors voting on the proposition, was' argued extens-
ively before the trial court. It is not cited by Appellant 
here as a ground for reversal, nor is this point argued. We 
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5 
therefore take it to be abandoned on this appeal and shall 
not belabor the question further. Reid v. Anderson, 116 
Utah 455, 211 P. 2d 206. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT CAN CORRECT THE PATENT TYPO-
GRAPHICAL ERROR IN SECTION 11, CHAPTER 104, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1961 THUS REMOVING ANY :pos .. 
SIBLE QUESTION OF ITS BEING VAGUE, INDEFINITE 
OR UNCERTAIN. 
Chapter 104, Laws of UtaJh 1961, establiShes the 
method of financing operations of public elemmrtlacy and 
secondary schools in this Stalte. Mter making provision 
for a uniform basic minimum scllool program, and provid-
ing for certain other permissive sources of additiooal oper-
ating revenue to local boards, :the Act, in sec1Jion 11, here 
questioned, purports to give local boards of education, upon 
grant of authority by the electorate, power to rad:se yet ad-
ditional revenue locally by means orf addirtiooal ad valorem 
levy. This is referred to as the "voted leeway" program. 
It is this provision, invoked by respondents, which appel-
bnt here questions. 
The first paraooraph of section 11 states: 
"With the consent of a majority of 11he electors of 1lhe 
district voting at an election or elections held far that 
purpose in the manner ,set fortftl in Section 53-2-12 
Ptah Code Annotated, 1953, any district may main~ 
t~in a school program in excess of the cost of :the pro-
gram refeiTed to in Sections 9 and 10 above. Said 
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6 
additional program shall be known as rthe 'voted J.ee. 
way' progrnm of the district. Said voted leeway pro. 
gram shall not e.x1ceed an amount equal rto 20% of ·the 
basic program of :the di.strict.'' 
Our position is that the reference rto Section 53-2-12, 
Uta!h Oode Annotated 1953, fur !Vhe manner of calling the 
election is a patent :typographim:l eiTOr, wlhich the court 
can OOITeCt, SJUJbstituting t:herefor SectiOIIl 53-7-12, Utah 
Code ArnnOitlated 1953. 
The satute erroneously cited treats of the general pow-
ers and dutieS of the State Board of Education, having 
nothing to do with 1Jhe financing of local school districts or 
electJions. On the Olfu.er hand, section 53-7-12, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, ~eats specifioall.y rthe call·ing of special 
elections by local boards of educaltion. 
Ohapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, repealed the former 
statutory p.vovisd.ons for financing public school operations, 
a system whloh also embraced the "voted leeway" fueory. 
Among the promo.ns thus repealed was section 53-7-8, 
Utah Oode Annortated 1953, which provided in part: 
'' . . . . With 1lhe consent of a majority of rthe electors 
of the district voting a:t an election or elections held 
for that purpose in the manner set fOTth in Section 53-
7-12, Utaih Code Annotated 1953, any district may 
maintain a schoo~ program ln excess of the above men-
·tioned cost in an amount not exceeding an additional 
2·5% of the cost of the basic program . . . ." 
The statute here attacked repla1ces thls section. It 
makes sense, fits tJhe over-all financing plan, and has been 
followed by several local districts. To refuse to read Chap-
ter 7 in lieu orf Chapter 2 in the questioned statute is to 
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tYld with a non sequitur; to read it as Chapter 7 makes the 
act barmol1iioos and avoids nonsense. The legislative intent 
1.s clt·ar. The trial coort merely corrected an obvious typo-
graphical error. The rule of const.ructioo we invoke is found 
in 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d Ed.) pages 460-
462, Sec. 4925: 
ueow-ts have permitted the substitution of one word 
for another: where it is necessary to make tlhe act har-
monious or to avoid repugnancy or inconsistency, ... 
where it is obvious that ·the word used in the act is t!he 
result of clerical error, or mistake, wihere the substi-
tution will make the act sensible . . . . 
ucourts have denied the power: Where t!he WOifd to be 
substituted affects the essence of the act and there is 
an ambigudcy as to what was intended, wlhere it would 
involve the exercise of a legislative function, where 
the act is ambiguous, where two legislative purposes 
a..re suggested and both render the act 'effective.'' 
This court has followed that rule. In the. case ofPeo-
ple vs. Hill, 3 Utah 334 ( 353) , 3 Pac. 75, tJhe court read a 
criminal statute con'tlad.ning a reference to a section 152 as 
though it were 151 in order to carry out the ll1Bllifest in-
tention of the legislature. See also Morrison-Merrill & Co. 
vs.Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 363, 18 P. 2d 295; Chez 
ex rei Weber College vs. Building Commission, 93 Utah 538, 
74 P. 2d 687; Norville vs. Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 
P. 2d 937; 126 ALR 1318. 
Appellant appears to take the position that the sta:turte 
in question, though read as urged by the responden1s and 
as COI'Tected by the trial court (R. 28), still contains an 
ambiguity in that the statutes referred to for the rna.nner 
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8. 
of calling and conducting the election refer to ~yers 
ad qualified electors who shall have paid a property tax. 
We again state that thoogh the appellant rurged be-
fore rthe trial court that the act was Ull1Constitutional ·be-
cause it provided for the ViQiting of qualified electors in the 
~hool district without regaro to property qualifications, 
he has abandoned this argument on appeal. He cites the 
refermces to property qualifieations orn:ly on the issue of 
vagueness, indcliniteness and uncertainty. 
It is remembered that we deal here solely with the 
manner of calling the election. Section 53-7-12, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, provides: 
". . . the Board of Education shaH give such reasonable 
notice of such submission as it may deem proper and 
slhall foHow the rocedure in elections fO!r the issuance 
of bonds so far as applicable .•.•.• " (Emphasis added) 
The procedure for the calling and COinductdng of bond 
elections is set forth in Sections 53-10-3 to 6 inclusive, Utah 
Oode Annotated 1953. 
Appellant does not assert that re8IX)ndents failed to 
follow the mechanical procedure set out in those sections, 
he meTely asserts that an ambiguity exists because a prop-
erty qualification is 1nteTposed on bond elections but is not 
interposed in "voted leeway" edectio!llS. 
Under the pro~sions of Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 
1961 we assert that we see no ambiguity; no debt is created 
by reason of the voted leeway election. All rthat was sought 
and all that was given by the electorate was permission or 
authority to operate the school system at a higher budge-
tary level, from local SQiUrces of revenue, than the board 
could othe'rwise provide. 
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POINT II 
THE TITLE TO CHAPTER 104, LAWS OF UTAH 
1961. MEETS THE STANDARD REQUIRED BY AR-
TICLE VI. SECITON 23, UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The pertinent Constitutional provision referred to 
states: 
" ... No bill shall be passed (by the Legislature) con-
taining more than one subject, whioh shall be clearly 
expressed in its title." 
Violation of this provision by Ohapter 104, Laws of 
Utah 1961 is not asserted in the pleadings. However, as 
stated earlier, we will not belaJbor this question. The trial 
court considered it, stating "thart: the law is not ,invalid on 
the above grounds.' ( R. 28) 
This court has had several occasions to examine leg-
islative acts in the light of that constitutional limitation. In 
the case of Kent Club vs. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P. 2d 
~70. the court upheld a statute amendatory of the coqJo-
ration code which dealt \Vi.th the regulation, control and 
revocation of charters of non-profit social clubs, although 
the Act. in effect, also amended the Liquor Control Act. 
We quote from the opinion the court's statement defining 
the extent of the constitutional interdiction: 
u ( 1) The title and the act should be surveyed in the 
light of the purpose of the above quoted section of the 
Constitution, which is to guard against the surrepti-
tious or inadvertent inclusion of subjects in legislation 
without legislators and the public being aware of its 
contents: 
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"(2) Due consideration should be given to the fact 
that legislati0111 is often necessarily comprehensive in 
covering a whoJe subject and that it is not invalid sim-
ply ;because certain porti0111S, if cOJlSiidered in isolation 
I 
would seem unreliated, but is proper so loog as all the 
provisi0111S have a direct relartionship to 1lhe subject 
legislated urpon; 
" ( 3) A liberal view should be ta:ken O!f both the act 
and the oonstitutional provisions so as not to hamper 
the law-making porweT, but to pern1it the adoption of 
·comprehensive measures .covering a whole subject; 
" ( 4) That each .A!ct ·must ·be viewed in its entirety and 
upon the basis of t!he circumstances and 00111ditions pe-
culiar to it, and must be regarded as co!llStitutional un-
less it plainly appears that the basic purpose of rthe 
oonstitutional provision is violated." 
See also State vs. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333 P. 2d 
1075, and State vs. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P. 2d 647. 
We quote the title to Chapter 104, Laws o.f Utah, 1961: 
"AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE STATE-SUPPORTED 
:MINIMUM SCHOOL PROGRAM, STATING THE 
OQSTS THEREOF, PRESCRIBING TI-llE AMOUNT 
OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS '"IO BE MADE BY THE 
STATE AND THE VARIOUS SCHOOL DIS'ffiiCfS 
TOWARlD THE PAYMENT OF THE COSTS THERE-
OF AND THE MANNER IN WIDCH THE VARI-
OUS SCHOOL DISTRICfS MAY QUALIFY FOR 
PARTICIPATION THEREIN; ENABLING SCHOOL 
DISTRIC"rS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SCHOOL 
SERVICES AND PROGRAMS; PRESCRIBING THE 
MANNER IN WHICH TAX LEVIES BY THE STATE 
SI-IALL BE MADE FOR PURPOSES OF MAKING 
SAID CONTRIBUTIONS; ENABLING THE SCHOOL 
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11 
DISTRICfS TO MAKE TAX LEVIES; PROVIDING 
FOR THE COLLECTION OF SAID TAX LEVIES 
BY THE RESPECTIVE COUNTIES; PROVllDiiNG 
FOR TilE DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL FUNDS 
AND REPEALING SECTIONS (named sections;) ... " 
It is observed from the title and from the Act itself 
that the Act deals comprehensively with the subject of 
school district operating revenue. It deals with nothing 
more than that. Most assuredly no one ean With reason 
assert that the Act, in view of the title, contains the evil 
calculated to be avoided by means orf the ·constitutional pro-
vision here invoked-the misleading of the public and leg-
islature by inserting intentionally or inadvertently any pro-
vision touching upon subject matters not disclosed in the 
title. 
The title to Chapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961, touches 
directly upon the subject matter contained in sec1Jion 11. 
We quote from that title: 
..... ENABLING SCHOOL DISTRICfS TO PROVIDE 
ADDITIONAL SCHOOL SERVICES AND PRO-
GRAMS; ... ENABLING THE SCHOOL DISTRICfS 
TO MAKE TAX LEVIES ... '' 
Article VI, Section 23, Utah Constitution, does NOT 
require the act to be restated in the title. 
Appellant would have usbe1i.eve ·that Chapter 104, Laws 
of Utah 1961, deals onJy with what is denominated the 
"Minbnwn School Program," or that 1lhe "voted leeway" 
Pl'O\ision of section 11 does noot bear upon the general sub-
ject of school district operating revenue. If this is not his 
JlOSition (and his position, incidentally, is nort clear), then 
he would have us believe that the subject of a basic or mini-
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12 
mum school financing plan cannot be combined with pro. 
visions for pemlissive additional S!Cihool operating revenue 
in 1he same act. We submit 1Jhese positions are untenable. 
POINT ill 
THE PROPOSITION SUBMI'ITED ~0 THE ELEC-
TORS WAS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS. 
The propositioo placed oo the ballot and published in 
the notice of ·the special election reads: 
"Shall the Board m Education of Provo City, State of 
Utah ibe authorized to maintain a 'voted leeway' pro-
gram as provided in Sectinn 11, Chapter 104, Laws of 
Utah 1961, nort to exceed ten per eent of t!he minimum 
basic program provided by law " 
Appellant attacks this proposition under Point ill of 
his brief for the reason that it does nort inform the voter 
of "the purpose or cost of 't:lhe proposed program." (Appel-
lants brief p. 1'6) . Authorities cited are propos!itioos to 
create debt and are, we therefore submit, not in pomt. This 
litigation deals solely with maintenance and opemting rev-
enues for SKjhoo~s. No d~bt is incurred by the action of 
respondentS here under attack. 
In adapting Ohaprte·r 104, Laws of Utah 1961, the Leg-
islature proceeded under two constitutional provisions, Ar-
tide X, Section 3, Utah Constitution, and Article Xlll, Sec-
tion 7, Utah Constitution. These prOJVide for the Uniform 
Schoo~ Fund and its administration. It ·behooves us tore-
view briefly these provisions and legislation adopted there-
under. 
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Tbe 1946 Amendment to Article XIII, Section 7, Utah 
Constitution, established a policy of the State to·· under-
write, with llmitatlons, a "minimum ·school program" 
throughout all districts of the State, and directed that rt:he 
Legislature im:plement this policy by law. The original 
legislative pronouncement thereunder, Chapter 80, Laws 
of Utah 1947, established the pattern material here; and 
though practically eaoh general session Olf the Legislature 
since then has amended or substituted Acts on this sub-
jt'\'t. the policy and mechanics have remained essentially 
thl' same. 
The Legislature establishes a minimum school progr'am 
t>xpressed, not in rate of taxation, but in monetary cost a:c· 
eording to the school population of the district, expressed in 
.. distribution units," arrived at by a formula calculated to 
equalize certain administ:Tative and overhead cost differen-
tials between large and small districts. Suffice it !here to 
point out that the detennination is the operating cost or 
amount to be disbursed, NOT the rate of taxation. 
The local board of education is then required to fix a 
stated levy and the additional amount, if any, required to 
meet the minimum school program fixed by the Legisla-
ture is then contributed from the Uniform ~hool Fund. 
Since 1947, variations have been built upon this procedure, 
but the theory has remained constant. 
By way of illustratioo only, a chart is included at 1lhe 
end of this brief, demonstrating 1:Jhe manner of operations 
of C.bapter 104, Laws of Utah 1961. The minimum school 
program is determined by the Legislature to be $5,400.00 
per distribution unit The local board must fix a levy of 
12 mills. The difference, if any, between the sum this will 
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raise and $5,:100.00 per distribution unit, is contributed to 
the distr:ict from the Unifmm School Fund. 
The remainder of Chapter 104, Larws of Utah 1961, is 
permissive. Shoruld the local board wish, it may participate 
in an additional state supported "leeway" operating pro.. 
gram, expressed in monetary 1COst, not a fixed levy, by fix-
ing an additional fom mill ad valorem levy, the State mak-
ing up the diffeTence. At this level, ·the Smte's COilltribu-
tion ceases. 
The Aet 1Jhen gives the local board· the authority, should 
it wish to e~and the operating school program further, to 
raise additional funds . by means of an additional local ad 
VJalorem levy of six mills oc a levy wmch will raise a sum 
equal to tihirteen per cent of the basic program, $5,400.00 
per dis~bution unit. 
'Dqe . Act then ~ts the loca1 board to establish an 
operating school program in addition to sums raised by the 
meallls set; :fjorth above, up to 20% o!f the basic program 
cost, $5,400.00 per distrybution unit, but to do this, the board 
of education must have the authority conferred by the elec-
tors of the disJrict. . This provision is oontained in Section 
11 of the Act, hePe attacked. 
The proposition voted upon is definite and clear----should 
the board of education have authority to establish a school 
operating program for the district, costing an additionallO% 
of the bask program, $5,400.00 per distribution unit The 
mill levy could not be fixed. The election was held Feb-
ruary 6, 1962. The assessed valuation o!f the district is not 
determined until August. Tne board's budget is fixed in 
June. .Assessed valuations and school censuses change. 
The Legislature changes the sum per distribution unit to 
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be apportioned from the Unifonn School Fund. The au-
thority sought by the board from the electors is a continu-
ing one. To attempt to phrase the proposition otherwise 
than done would not only be ridi,culous, it would be impos-
sible. 
Neither the act nor the constitutional provisions Wl-
dt•rtake to fix levies. They merely limit the power· to do 
so. Most of the levies for school operation, at least £or the 
poorer districts, are not even fixed by the local boards of 
edueation. Levies, if any, for the Untfrorm School Fund 
are determined by the State Tax Commission based upon 
estimates of that Commission as to other available revenue 
SOW'CeS and upon estimates of the State Board of Educa-
tion as to needs. Levies to carry out the purely local ef-
forts of boards of education above the State supported school 
program, are fixed by the Board of County Commissioners. 
We see nothing wrong wi1:Ih this. Appellant points out 
nothing. In this State levies are generally fixed adminis-
tlatively, SU!bject to limitations contained in the enabling 
legislation. The Legislature could as well have given the 
board of education the power conferred in Section 11, Laws 
of Utah 1961, without prior authority from the electors. 
It c00se this additional limitation upon the additional ex-
pansion of the school program. The proposition submit-
ted, as found by the trial court, adequately informed the 
electors of the authority sought by the board of education. 
CONCLUSION 
We are not her concerned with the wisdom or unwis-
dom of the Legislative arrangement for financing opera-
tions of the pulic schools. That is a political question not 
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subject to judicial review. Allen vs. Merrell, 6 Utah 2d, 32, 
305 P.2d 490. Rather, we are concerned with 1:Jhe validity 
of an act of the Legislature and actions taken by respond-
ents pursuant thereto. 
We take it to be fundamental legal axioms that, first, 
a state constitution is a limitation upon the power of a legis-
lature, and not ~ grant of power, second, all presumptioos 
and intendments are resolved in favor of validity of legis-
lative acts, and third, that a questiooed statute will1be given 
a oonstnliction consistent with validity irf at all possible. 
Viewed thus, and in the light of previous pronounce-
ments of this Court, the Act here questioned is valid, the 
action of respondents taken thereunder .proper, and appel-
lants positioo is, we submit, unte.na;ble. 
Respectfull submitted, 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN 
of YOUNG, YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorney for Respondents 
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